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CHANGE AND CONTINUITY:

A

HISTORICAL

PERSPECTIVE OF CAMPUS SEARCH AND SEIZURE
ISSUES
Dana E. Christman*

Illegal searches and seizures on college campuses involve
issues that create much anxiety among college administrators.
Images of the legal remedies that the students involved may
seek and the extent of the universities' potential liability are
aptly conjured by the administrators facing illegal search and
seizure cases on their campuses. Due to the potential for liability, one would assume that college administrators would have
become experts at dealing with cases involving searches and
seizures. Some of the case law reviewed in this paper illustrates that this is not the case.
Perhaps campus officials can take comfort in knowing that
there is legal counsel available in the event that illegal
searches and seizures take place. Moreover, many administrators might believe they cannot bear any personal liability if
they are not personally committing the illegal searches and
seizures. Nevertheless, searches and seizures in on -campus
housing occur with relative frequency; thus, college administrators should take inventory of their knowledge about what
constitutes legal searches and seizures to be able to make better policy decisions regarding them.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and

* The author is an assistant professor at Northwest Missouri State University.

141

142

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2002

particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per1
sons or things to be seized.
The Fourth Amendment has its origins prior to the American Revolution in the United States and "is more of an expres2
sion of a philosophy." Belief in the inherent correctness of the
Fourth Amendment is so prevalent that Justice Stewart said
that "[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is no3
where more vital than in the community of American schools."
This paper will address Fourth Amendment issues regarding on-campus housing in public institutions of higher education. Smaller emphasis will be placed on cases from private institutions, and two such instances will be used to shed further
light upon Fourth Amendment issues. Case law is cited in an
effort to buttress the comments of the author. While not exhaustive, the cases cited have been selected based on their
uniqueness to lend comprehension to policy decision-making in
areas involving the Fourth Amendment. Presented chronologically, readers should gain an historical perspective on how legal decisions dealing with the Fourth Amendment have been
rendered and how they have been applied to search and seizure
issues involving college student on-campus housing.

I. FRAMING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
College and university officials as well as campus, state,
and local law enforcement officers often find themselves addressing problems which require their entry into students'
4
dormitory rooms. How access to dorm rooms is gained and
what occurs inside them can raise Fourth Amendment concerns. Legal problems that typically stem from dorm room
searches are caused both by who conducts the searches and
5
what is the purpose of the searches.

1. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
2. Stuart C. Berman, Student Author, Student Fourth Amendment Rights: Defining the Scope of the T.L.O. School-Search Exception, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1077, 1083
(1991).
3. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
4. Joseph M. Smith & John L. Strope, The Fourth Amendment: Dormitory Room
Searches in Public Universities, 97 W. Educ. L. Rep. 985 (1995).
5. !d.

SEARCH AND SEIZURE ISSUES

141]

143

Defining the term "search" may be helpful in understanding
its constitutional implications. According to Black's Law Dictionary a search is:
An examination of a person's house or other buildings or
premises, or of his person, or of his vehicle, aircraft, etc., with
a view to the discovery of contraband or illicit or stolen property, or some evidence of guilt to be used in the prosecution of
a criminal action for some crime or offense with which he is
6
charged.

It is apparent that this definition of the term "search" implicates the actions of university officials and their representatives when they encounter contraband or illegal substances
upon conducting routine dorm room inspections or assessing or
performing maintenance needs.
In a review of student Fourth Amendment rights, Berman
explains the important function of the warrant clause contained in the Fourth Amendment:
The presence of a search warrant serves a high function. Absent some grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the citizen and the police. It
was done so that an objective mind might weigh the need to
invade that privacy in order to enforce the law. The right of
privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion
of those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of
7
criminals.
Determining which types of searches are subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy and warrant clause protection
has always been a controversial constitutional issue. In Katz v.
8
United States, Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion, defined the two-pronged test which courts rely on in determining
whether a person can expect to be protected by the Fourth
Amendment. He concluded that in order to qualify for constitutional protection, a person must first "have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."'9 The constitutional question involving on-campus

6.
7.
8.
9.

Henry Campbell Black, Black's Law Dictionary, 1349 (6th ed., West 1990).
Berman, supra n. 3, at 1085.
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
!d. at 353.
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searches is whether campus dorm rooms are protected under
Harlan's two pronged test, and if so, to what extent.

II. CASES INVOLVING SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

An examination of the case law spanning the past 30 years
dealing with on-campus searches and seizures and their Fourth
Amendment implications illustrates just how incongruent
courts have been in deciding the constitutionality of searches
and seizures.
10
In the 1968 case, Moore v. Student Affairs Committee, the
court granted very broad authority to the university to conduct
searches. In this case, the Dean of Men at Troy State University in Alabama, accompanied by two narcotics agents, conducted a warrantless search of six dorm rooms in two different
residence halls on campus. In Moore's room, they found a
matchbox containing what later proved to be a small amount of
marijuana. Moore had been present but had not given his permission for the search.
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Alabama ruled in favor of Troy State University concluding
that "[c]ollege students who reside in dormitories have a special relationship with the college involved .... Insofar as the
Fourth Amendment affects that relationship, it does not depend on either a general theory of right of privacy or on tradi11
tional property concepts." Furthermore, the court stated that
the "validity [of the search] is determined by whether the regulation is a reasonable exercise of the college's supervisory
12
duty." More importantly, the court ruled that a "standard of
'reasonable cause to believe"' justified the search of Moore's
room by the Dean of Men, even when the sole purpose of the
13
search was to seek evidence of violations of criminallaw.
Quite significant in Moore is the court's willingness to allow
a standard of "reasonable cause to believe" and to state that it
is "lower than the constitutionally protected criminal law stan14
dard of'probable cause."' It is apparent that the court's ruling
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
ld. at 729.
ld.
Id. at 730.
ld.
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helped to more clearly define the latitude with which university officials could act. University officials are given far greater
latitude under Moore than are police authorities because of the
"special relationship" the court said college students have with
universities. The Moore court even stated that the university
had a reasonable right to inspect rooms, which might infringe
on the "outer boundaries" of the student's Fourth Amendment
rights, provided the university deemed it necessary in order to
15
operate the university as an educational institution. The constitutional boundary line for the search in Moore drawn by the
court was that the university had to believe that the student
was using the room for illegal purposes or a purpose which
16
would otherwise seriously interfere with campus discipline.
The court concluded that "regulations and rules which are necessary in maintaining order and discipline are always consid17
ered reasonable."
Two years later, in 1971, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania took a somewhat different view from that in Moore and
granted less deference to the right universities have to conduct
searches by specifically appl~ng the exclusionary rule in a case
1
involving criminal conduct. The exclusionary rule "commands
that where evidence has been obtained in violation of the
search and seizure protections guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, the illegally obtained evidence cannot be used at the
19
trial of the defendant." When a narcotics agent and a state
trooper, accompanied by a university official, had a warrant to
search a student's room on the campus of Bucknell University,
a public institution, the court looked at the applicability of the
Fourth Amendment due to an improper entry into the student's
20
room. In this case, the record clearly indicates that the Head
Resident of McCloskey's residence hall had used his passkey to
21
allow the officers into McCloskey's room.
The court determined that the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures "requires that
before a police official enters a private premise to conduct a
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

!d.
!d. at 728.
!d.
Cmmw. v. McCloskey, 217 Pa. Super. 432 (1970).
Black, supra n. 7, at 391.
McCloskey, 217 Pa. Super. at 433-34.
!d. at 434.
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search or to make an arrest, he must give notice of his identity
22
and purpose." The court cited a Supreme Court case to support its ruling:
An unannounced intrusion into a dwelling ...
unannounced intrusion whether officers break
force open a chain lock on a partially opened
locked door b¥ use of a passkey, or ... open
3
unlocked door.

is no less an
down a door,
door, open a
a closed but

The court determined that there had been no exigent circumstances which would have justified entry into McCloskey's
24
locked room without announcement of identity or purpose.
Although the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania cited Moore
to support its argument, the key factor, according to this court,
was that Moore only involved disciplinary action by the school,
25
whereas McCloskey involved criminal prosecution.
The
26
"fruits" of the search were deemed inadmissible. The findings
of the lower court were reversed and the court vacated
McCloskey's sentence for possession of five pounds of mari•
27
Juana.
28
In a case in 1971, Piazzola v. Watkins, the court focused
on the police involvement aspect of a search as well as the contractual relationship the student had with the university and
again gave less deference to the right universities have to conduct searches. Here, the problem was not so much with the entry into Piazzola's room, since it related to the university's
function as an educational institution, but rather with the application of the regulation so as to authorize a search for criminal evidence. The court held that a student occupying a college
dormitory room enjoys the protection of the Fourth Amendment, and evidence obtained by an unreasonable and warrantless search is subject to the exclusionary rule and is inad29
missible in criminal proceedings.
Once again, the search took place at Troy State University
in Alabama. Law enforcement officers, accompanied by univerId.
!d. (quoting Sabbath v. U.S., 391 U.S. 585, 590 (1968)).
ld. at 435.
ld. at 436.
Id. at 437.
ld.
442 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1971).
29. Id. at 285.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
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sity officials, conducted warrantless searches in six or seven
30
dormitory rooms in two different residence halls on campus.
Piazzola's room was searched twice. The first search, in which
two narcotics agents and a university official were present,
turned up no evidence. The second search was conducted solely
31
by state and city police officials, who found marijuana. Piazzola and another student were tried in a lower court and found
32
guilty of possession of marijuana. On appeal, the court held
that:
The University retains broad supervisory powers ... provided
[regulations are] reasonably construed and ... limited in ...
application to further the University's function as an educational institution. The regulation cannot be construed or applied so as to give consent to search for evidence for the primary purpose of a criminal prosecution. Otherwise, the
regulation itself would constitute an unconstitutional attempt
to require a student to waive his protection from unreasonable searches and seizures as a condition to his occupancy of a
33
college dormitory room.
In affirming the appellate court's reversal of Piazolla's conviction, the court once again emphasized that university students do not leave their constitutional rights at the door of the
university. Piazzola also illustrates that courts in 1971 were
still ruling that universities had fairly wide latitude in warrantless dormitory room searches as long as it was only university officials who were doing the searching and the search was
not primarily conducted for criminal investigation purposes.
34
Smyth v. Lubbers was decided by the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, Southern Division in 1975 and went even further than Piazolla in curtailing the right universities have to conduct searches. This case,
involving a warrantless search by university officials, took
place on the campus of Grand Valley State College, a public institution in Michigan. The court held that the Fourth Amendment applies to governmental searches whether or not the "po35
lice" conduct the search. Although the university maintained
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

!d. at 286.
ld.
ld. at 285.
ld. at 289.
398 F. Supp. 777 (W.D. Mich. 1975).
ld. at 787.
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that the search was administrative in nature, the affected students sued for violation of their civil rights and won because
the court held that the searches were in essence seeking criminal evidence. Subsequently, the students received injunctive
reliefwith respect to the college's disciplinary proceedings.
In Smyth, the court did not adhere to the type of reasoning
that we saw in Moore. Whereas in Moore, the court had held
that searches of dormitory rooms of college students might infringe on the outer boundaries of the students' Fourth Amendment rights, Smyth held that the "interest in the privacy of his
room is not at the 'outer limits' but at the core of the Fourth
6
Amendment."a Of greater significance to college administrators, the court noted that the Fourth Amendment is not limited
to criminal prosecutions, but that it applies "to all [cases] alike,
17
whether accused of crime or not.":
The Moore court previously upheld the right of the university to conduct warrantless searches based on reasonable
cause. In Smyth, the court held that officials of a public university merely conducting a search that feigns administrative
purposes, but is in fact a search for criminal evidence, must
show probable cause and obtain a search warrant prior to con38
ducting the search." In contrast with Moore, in which the
court found that search warrants were unnecessary, the Smyth
case, like Piazzola, focuses more on the purpose or intent of the
search. The court suggests that routine and scheduled
searches, general in nature, might not be subject to the warrant clause, but searches involving activities that are essentially criminal in nature and similar in substance to police
searches are subject to the Fourth Amendment regardless of
whether the evidence is being sought for criminal or university
disciplinary proceedings. :Jg
In Smyth, the Court recognized that the University had a
clear policy in place with respect to dormitory searches:
The college's policy regarding room searches was quite clear
and provided that if College officials have reasonable cause to
believe that students are continuing to violate federal, state
or local laws or College regulations, the room is subject to
search by College authorities. A search will be conducted re36.
37.
38.
39.

!d. at 789.
!d. at 786 (quoting Weeks u. U.S., 232 U.S. 3S:l, 392 (1914)).
!d. at 788.
!d.
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luctantly and only if authorized by the GVSC President or a
40
.
d es1gnee.

The court further stated that "the plaintiffs' rooms were entered and searched pursuant to the College regulations and
under the authority of the College Room Entry Procedures Rule
41
2c." Nevertheless, the court found the college liable of violating the Fourth Amendment because the room search was conducted without a warrant and focused on one particular individual who was suspected of criminal activity and which aimed
42
at discovering specific evidence. So, even though the search
was based on an administrative rule, its net effect was to discover criminal evidence, and as such, could not survive constitutional scrutiny.
43
In a 1976 case, State v. Kappes, the court supported the
right universities have to conduct searches by agreeing with
Northern Arizona University officials that the purpose of entering Kappe's room was not for purposes of collecting criminal
evidence, and that the discovery and seizure of marijuana by
student advisors routinely makin~ a room inspection were not
4
the result of an unlawful search. Additionally, the court addressed whether the student advisors had the authority to allow university and law enforcement officials into the room once
they discovered marijuana and found that since they had a
right to be in the room, they also had a right to allow law enforcement officials into the room.
Of significance to this case is the fact that the court found
that the student advisors were acting as private individuals
and not government officials, which would have subjected the
evidence they seized to the exclusionary rule in subsequent
criminal proceedings against Kappes. The court concluded,
" ... [w]e do not find that they [the student resident advisors]
are tainted with that degree of governmental authority which
45
will invoke the fourth amendment."

40. ld. at 782.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 786.
43. 26 Ariz. App. 567 (1976).
44. ld. at 570.
45. ld.
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In the 1976 case of Morale v. Grigel, the Federal District
Court of New Hampshire held that the civil rights of Morale
had been violated by warrantless searches by college officials
but ultimately supported the right universities have to conduct
searches if they are conducted for disciplinary proceedings
only. The university won the case because the plaintiff, Morale,
had attempted to argue that the exclusionary rule applied to
campus disciplinary hearings.
In Morale, the Resident Assistant (RA), Grigel, and Head
Resident of a dormitory on the campus of New Hampshire
Technical Institute (NHTI), a public institution, received a report of a stolen stereo and decided to search student rooms for
the stereo. Their intent was to ask for students' permission to
search rooms if they were present but to use a passkey to gain
entry and search rooms in their absence. When they came to
Morale's room, he was present but did not specifically consent
to the search. Although they did not locate the stereo, they did
have a strong suspicion that Morale had been smoking mariJUana.
Over the next two days, Grigel, usually in the company of
other students or RAs, conducted no less than four separate,
warrantless searches of Morale's room. Ultimately, he discovered marijuana seeds in a film canister in Morale's room. The
court ruled that the four searches, conducted under Grigel's authority as an RA, were "inextricably bound together, one leading to the other; therefore, the taint of any one flows through
the rest rendering the final seizure susceptible to censure for
47
any prior Fourth Amendment violation."
Although this case does not provide the best example of a
"tainted search," the court in Morale emphasizes that a first
search which is illegal makes any other subsequent searches
illegal as well. The court also looks at the "reasonableness" of
the search as it did in Moore, McCloskey, Smyth, and Kappes.
In part of his summary, the judge ruled that "the search must
further an interest that is separate and distinct from that
served by New Hampshire's criminal law ... [and] intensive

46. 422 F. Supp. 988 (N.H. 1976).
47. !d. at 997.
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searches of rooms for stolen goods serve no legitimate interest
48
of the Institute."
Further, the court addressed whether the search was lawful
based on Morale's consent:" . . . [if] it has appeared that the
consent was not given voluntarily-that it was granted only in
submission to a claim of lawful authority-then we have found
49
the consent invalid and the search unreasonable."
Lastly, like the holdings in Piazzola, Smyth, and Kappes,
the court also held that the university could not "condition at50
tendance at NHTI upon waiver of constitutional rights." In
the end, however, the court found that no real remedy existed
for Morale because the evidence obtained by the illegal
searches was only used only for internal campus disciplinary
purposes to which the exclusionary rule does not apply.
In 1982, the U.S. Supreme Court in Washington v. Chris51
man contemplated whether a police officer could, in accordance with the Fourth Amendment, accompany an arrested
student into his residence hall room and seize contraband dis52
covered there in plain view. The Court supported the right
universities have to conduct searches if the plain view rule to
the Warrant Clause applies.
In Chrisman, the campus police officer at Washington State
University noticed a student leaving a residence hall with a
half gallon bottle of gin. When the underage student was
stopped and asked for identification, the student told the officer
his identification was in his room. The officer considered the
student under arrest but accompanied the student to his room
to retrieve his I.D. When they arrived at the student's room,
the officer remained in the open doorway while the student retrieved his I.D. Also in the room was the student's roommate,
Chrisman. 5a
Seconds after the first student entered the room, the officer
noticed seeds and a pipe lying on a desk in plain view. The officer entered the room, ascertained that the suspect seeds were
marijuana seeds, and that the pipe smelled of marijuana. After
reading both students their Miranda rights, which they waived,
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

!d. at 988.
!d.
!d. at 999.
455 U.S. 1 (1982).
!d.
Id. at 3.
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the officer asked if there were other drugs in the room, and
Chrisman handed him a box containing three bags of marijuana and $112 cash. After a second officer arrived, the officers
explained to both students that they had an absolute right to
insist on a search warrant, but that they could voluntarily consent to a search of the room. The students expressed their consent and signed written forms consenting to the search, which
54
yielded more marijuana and some LSD.
In this case, a divided court ruled in favor ofthe University.
The Court first dealt with the "plain view" exception to the
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. This exception permits a law enforcement officer to seize what clearly is incriminating evidence or contraband when it is discovered in a place
5
where the officer has a right to be. 5 Next, the Court dealt with
the issue of whether the officer had a right to be in the doorway
of the student's room. It determined that the officer had a right
to accompany the student to his room and to keep the arrested
student within view, stating, "it is of no legal significance
whether the officer was in the room, on the threshold, or in the
hallway, since he had a ri~ht to be in any of these places as an
6
incident of a valid arrest." Finally, the Court stated that "the
fundamental premise [is] that the Fourth Amendment protects
only against unreasonable intrusions into an individual's privacy .... The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit seizure of
57
evidence of criminal conduct found in these circumstances."
58
In 1991, the court in Duarte v. Commonwealth supported
a university's right to conduct searches. In this case, the Dean
of Students at a private institution, Averett College, directed
two college officials to search Duarte's room located in a campus dormitory. The college officials found several bags of marijuana and drug paraphernalia. Duarte was arrested and convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute,
59
which he appealed.
On appeal, Duarte contended that the search of his room
was unreasonable and unlawful; therefore, the evidence ob-

54. !d. at 4.
55. I d. at 5.
56. !d. at 8.
57. ld. at 8-9 (emphasis added).
58. 12 Va. App. 1023 (1991).
59. ld. at 1024-25.
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tained as a result of the search should have been excluded from
60
his trial. The court ruled against exclusion:
[F]ourth amendment protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures are 'wholly inapplicable' to a search or
seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the
participation or knowledge of any governmental official. 61
The Duarte court held that university officials were acting
merely as individuals and the search they conducted was legal
while the Smyth court determined that university officials were
acting as agents of the government and the search they con62
ducted was illegal. The divergent holdings are due to the fact
that the university in Smyth was public while the college in
Duarte was private, and that criminal evidence obtained by
private individuals or entities is not subject to the exclusionary
rule.
63
In the 1992 case of State v. Hunter, the court supported a
university's right to conduct searches. In this case, Hunter was
a student at Utah State University. During a wave of vandalism in Hunter's residence hall and after informing residents at
a floor meeting that room to room inspections likely would be
conducted if the vandalism did not cease, college officials, along
with a campus police officer, conducted room inspections on
Hunter's floor. The officers and college officials found stolen
64
university property, including a sign and a banner. Hunter
was subsequently charged with a class B misdemeanor.
Citing Kappes, Katz, and Moore, the court in this case concluded that the " ... search was a reasonable exercise of the
university's authority to maintain an educational environment .... Thus, it is incumbent upon the university to take
whatever reasonable measures are necessary to provide a
65
clean, safe, well-disciplined environment in its dormitories."
The court determined that because the search was conducted
by university officials and that the accompanying police officer
was not directly involved, the evidence seized was not subject
to the exclusionary rule and was not suppressable in subse60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

!d. at 1025.
!d.
Smyth, 398 F. Supp. 777 at 778.
831 P.2d 1033 (Utah App. 1992).
!d. at 1035.
Id. at 1036.
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quent criminal proceedings. This holding contrasts sharply
with those of Piazzola, Smyth, and Morale. Furthermore, in
justifying the search in Hunter, the court ruled that " ... not
only did university officials have a right to maintain an educa66
tional atmosphere, they had a contractual duty to do so."
67
In 1996, the court in Commonwealth v. Neilson curtailed
the manner in which universities may conduct searches. The
search in this case took place in a student's room at Fitchburg
68
State College, a public college in Massachusetts. The court
determined that college officials made a lawful entry into Neilson's room and discovered marijuana plants and many materials used in the cultivation of marijuana in Neilson's closet.
They contacted the campus police, who entered the room, saw
the evidence, seized it, and removed it from the room. Neilson
69
was not present during the search and seizure.
Here, the court ruled that a "constitutional violation occurred when the campus police searched the room and seized
evidence ... without a search warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances."70 More importantly, the court looked at Neilson's
consent to the search of his room through his residence contract. This was how the court determined that Neilson had
given his consent to college officials. What the court stressed,
however, was that Neilson did not give his expressed consent to
the police: "The [defendant's] consent [was] given, not to police
officials, but to the University and the latter cannot fragmen71
tize, share or delegate it." Although the marijuana and cultivation materials were in plain view of the police, the court
found that "the plain view doctrine does not apply to the police
seizure where the officers were not lawfully present in the
dormitory room when they made their plain view observations."72 The court, focused on the warrant clause of the Fourth
Amendment, stating that "the sole purpose of the warrantless
police entry ... was to confiscate contraband for purposes of a

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

!d. at 1037.
423 Mass. 75 (1996).
Id. at 76.
!d. at 76-77.
Id. at 79.
ld. (quoting People u. Cohen, N.Y. Misc. 2d. 366, 368 (1968)).
!d.
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criminal proceeding. An entry for such a purpose required a
73
warrant .... "
In a 1996 case similar to Duarte, the Supreme Court of
Tennessee supported the right universities have to conduct
74
searches in State v. Burroughs. In this case, the court held
that the director of a residence hall at Knoxville College, a private institution, acted as a private individual rather than as a
state agent when he searched a student's room and discovered
cocaine. The director of the hall contacted a local police officer,
who arrived at the room, determined that the director had
found cocaine, and called a narcotics officer. The director
turned over the cocaine to the local police officer after removing
75
it from the room. The student was then arrested and convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to sell.
In Burroughs, the court cited a U.S. Supreme Court case,
stating that it "recognized that a search by a private individual
may transgress the protections of the Fourth Amendment ...
when an individual acts as an agent or instrument of the
76
state." As in Duarte, the court determined that the college official in Burroughs was not acting as an agent of the state. This
ruling contrasts the Smyth ruling, where college officials were
found to be acting as agents of the state. Again, we encounter
the divergent ways in which courts rule on Fourth Amendment
issues involving private institutions and public institutions:
Duarte and Burroughs involved private institutions whereas
Smyth involved a public institution.
Ill. FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Given the various divergent views courts have taken in
cases dealing with search and seizure issues, it will be interesting to note how a future court will rule in cases involving
searches by campus police officers at Appalachian State University, a public institution. This university has adopted a policy which "allows campus police to search a dormitorl room for
7
drugs without a student's permission or a warrant."
73. Id.
74. 926 S.W.2d 243 (Tenn. 1996).
75. Id. at 244-245.
76. Id. at 245 (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971)).
77. Ben Gose, Dorm Searches Stir Student Complaints at Appalachian State U.,
The Chron. of Higher Educ. (Mar. 22, 1996) (available at <http://chronicle.com> ).
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If the court follows the ruling in Smyth, it is likely that the
searches will be held invalid for violating the Fourth Amendment, despite the fact that the university claims it does not intend to use the evidence discovered in the searches for criminal
proceedings. It is hypothesized that "the university that relies
upon campus law enforcement officials to conduct searches may
be posturing itself for a challenge that it operates its special
78
needs search as a pretext for criminal investigations." Additional instances of potential constitutional violations involve
79
similar policies emploJ'ed by the University of Wisconsin and
8
Southern University.
The cases reviewed in this paper provide a basis for critically viewing search and seizure issues in college settings.
Whether Fourth Amendment protections apply is determined
by several factors. First, administrators at private institutions
can be confident that any searches and seizures conducted by
college officials, whether for school disciplinary proceedings or
for criminal indictments, will be upheld as legal and constitutional.81 Second, administrators at public institutions making
search and seizure policy decisions must take into consideration who will be making the search and whether the person(s)
conducting the search were lawfully in the place where the
search occurred or whether a search warrant should have been
obtained prior to the search. A police officer may conduct a
search if an exception to the warrant clause exists, such as the
82
plain view doctrine. Third, one should review the purpose of
the search to determine whether the search was conducted for
disciplinary purposes or whether it was conducted with the intent of instituting criminal proceedings against the student or
students involved. Most courts seem unwilling to allow warrantless searches that have the primary purpose of discovering
83
criminal evidence. Finally, it is incumbent upon the prudent
administrator to research the law in his or her own jurisdiction
78. J. F. Shekleton, Presentation, Campus Life and Gouern.ment Inuestigations
(Annual Meeting of the Nat! Assoc. of College and U. Attys., San Antonio, Tex., June
16-19, 1996), in ED399893, 24.
79. University of Wisconsin Students Protest Dorm Search, Mar(juana Seizures,
The Chron. of Higher Educ. (Mar. 29, 1996) (available at <http://chronicle.com> ).
80. La. Judge Prohibits Random Dormitory Searches at Southern U., The Chron.
of Higher Educ. (Nov. 1, 1996) (available at <http~Lft_hronicle.c.Qlll>l.
81. See e.g. Duarte and Burroughs.
82. See e.g. Chrisman.
83. See e.g. Smyth, McCloskey and Piazzola.
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to determine what policies will enjoy constitutional protection
84
because contradictions in the law exist across state lines.
As in most situations, hindsight provides the best opportunity to evaluate actions or decisions. Although there is no substitution for sound legal counsel, college administrators may
yet be served by becoming well-informed regarding the provisions of the Fourth Amendment and by understanding how
these provisions have been interpreted by courts in their respective jurisdictions. By using these two criteria in making
search and seizure policy decisions, administrators can avoid
potential violations of the Fourth Amendment.

84. See e.g., Neilson, but see Hunter.

